The latter lesson did not go unnoticed by the Russian high command either.Īs a result, the need for increased protection for APCs became more urgent. A Chechen fighter passes by a knocked out Russian BMP-2 in Grozny, Chechnya. Often in this conflict, Russian APCs, such as the BTR-70, and even Infantry Fighting Vehicles (IFVs), such as the BMP-2, found their protection hopelessly outmatched by weapons such as RPG-7s and Anti-Tank Guided Missiles (ATGMs) used by their Chechen adversaries. Among these were the importance of training ground troops in the use and maintenance of existing and new equipment, the importance of gathering intelligence that can provide correct estimations of the enemy’s capabilities, the importance of assault planning and coordination as well as plan flexibility, and the poor performance of Cold War era Armored Personnel Carriers (APCs) against modern anti-tank weapons.

There were lots of lessons to be learned from the first Russian experience in Grozny (1994-1996). The war ended with the withdrawal of Russian forces from Chechnya following a negotiated settlement. After suffering enormous casualties, the Russians finally managed to capture the city, only to be forced out of it again by a Chechen counterattack in 1996. In December 1994, Russian forces assaulted the Chechen capital of Grozny in what would later be known as the First Chechen War. Heavy Armored Personnel Carrier – Unknown Number Built

Modern russian light tank